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Abstract 
Relying on situational crime prevention perspective, this study compares successful and unsuccessful pirate attacks 
reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) from the year 2000 through 2013 (n = 4,902). The study builds 
upon the recent work of Shane and Magnuson in Justice Quarterly, pp 1–26 (2014), which found various SCP tech-
niques effectively prevented piracy attacks on a global level. The current study builds upon these findings by testing 
whether the global effect of SCP is consistent across individual continents. A series of mixed-effects logistic regres-
sion models and follow-up likelihood ratio tests were incorporated to explore the research question. In each model, 
SCP techniques were associated with unsuccessful piracy attacks on a global level. When considered individually, SCP 
techniques were equally effective in each continent. However, the use of multiple techniques classified within the 
increased effort technique of SCP was associated with increased likelihood of unsuccessful attacks in only 3 (South East 
Asia, Far East, and Rest of the World) of the 6 continents included in this study. The implications of these findings are 
discussed.
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Background
Piracy reports from the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB) reveal that actual and attempted attacks against 
ships worldwide have increased 129% between 1991 and 
2014, with large spikes between 2000–2003 and 2009–
2011 (IMB 2014a). Although some downward trends 
began in 2011, led primarily by reductions around the 
Straits of Malacca, piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa contin-
ued to escalate mostly off the coast of Somalia, Tanzania 
and around the Gulf of Aden (Prins 2014) with sustained 
rates of violence. The IMB recently reported that attacks 
against small tankers around the coast of Southeast Asia 
were responsible for a 75% increase in global ship hijack-
ings between 2013 and 2014 (IMB 2014b).
Piracy continues to pose a threat to the world’s eco-
nomic interests particularly in the Horn of Africa region 
(Bowden 2010; Salopek 2013; US National Security 
Council 2014 p. 4) and is largely driven by macro-level 
land-based social disorganization (Fund For Peace 2014) 
that facilitates crime and corruption, which enables 
piracy (Ho 2009; Middleton 2008). United States foreign 
policy in this region is based largely on a strategy of lim-
ited coalition and multinational agreements that address 
piracy; a permanent solution will require a sustained 
long-term international effort that includes diplomatic, 
economic, social, military, intelligence, law enforce-
ment and judicial intervention (De Montclos 2012; Otto 
2011; US National Security Council 2014; van Ginkel and 
Landman 2012).
The shipping industry cannot wait for these political 
and law enforcement measures to materialize to reduce 
piracy and improve safety. The international law enforce-
ment community is not necessarily well suited to address 
piracy, particularly when dealing with states that are at 
risk of failure (Forsyth et al. 2009, p. 672; also see Mur-
phy 2008, 2009). This is complicated by legal constraints 
(Chalk 2010; Gill 1996; Hawkins 2009; Kraska and Wilson 
2011; Murphy 2011; Sterio 2011) and delays associated 
with defining and codifying piracy, wrangling diplomatic 
efforts, financing prosecutions, crafting international 
agreements and establishing legal jurisdiction (Fokas 
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1997; Hong and Ng 2010). Although a long-term strat-
egy is important to regional stability, the daily approach 
to address piracy requires a tactical effort that can be 
applied when vessels are threatened. The world’s oceans 
are vast, remote, unassigned spaces (Felson 1994) that 
make piracy easier to perpetrate, harder to detect and 
prevent, but not inevitable. There are methods that 
merchant marines and their vessels can employ to pro-
tect themselves that alter the transit environment and 
their immediate situational perspective before an attack 
and while an attack is underway. The situational crime 
prevention (SCP) approach is informed by analysis that 
focuses on the crime, not the criminal. It values preven-
tion over arrest and empowers the individual over the 
government to construct a safer environment when tra-
ditional law enforcement or military resources are not 
available (Clarke 1997; Goldstein 1979).
Most previous studies analyze piracy from a descrip-
tive or macro-level perspective, which is too general-
ized to offer substantive crime prevention measures (e.g., 
Psarros et  al. 2011; Wong and Tsz Leung 2012). SCP is 
a micro-level approach with a wide body of research 
touting its crime control benefits (e.g., Clarke 1997). An 
emerging body of research now extends SCP techniques 
to piracy with promising results (Bryant et  al. 2014; 
Shane and Magnuson 2014). The present study aims 
to widen the SCP literature by testing whether the SCP 
techniques found in previous piracy studies are equally 
effective across different regions of the world.
Literature review
The current literature on piracy mainly lacks a crimi-
nological perspective (Twyman-Ghoshal 2014) and is 
largely focused on describing its frequency and nature 
in terms of trends and patterns such as those around 
the Singapore Strait and South China Sea (Von Hoesslin 
2012), Nigeria (De Montclos 2012), Southeast Asia and 
Africa (Jeong 2015). Other studies examine the types of 
vessels most often attacked along with the weapons used 
(Sullivan 2010), as well as attacks that cluster in time 
and space (Talley and Rule 2008; Townsley and Oliverira 
2012; Marchione and Johnson 2013).
Piracy varies by region in terms of frequency, violence, 
distance from the shore, time of day and the ship’s posi-
tion (Nincic 2009; Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014). 
Southeast Asia experienced the highest number of pirate 
attacks compared to other regions in the 1990’s (Chalk 
1998; Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014), particularly 
near the Singapore Straits, the Malacca Straits and Indo-
nesia (Beckman 2002). By comparison, piracy around 
Africa remained constant between 2001 and 2006, then 
increased after 2006 (Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014) 
with Nigeria and Somalia experiencing the most attacks 
(Nincic 2009). Von Hoesslin (2012) notes that while most 
pirate attacks in Southeast Asia occur close to shore, 
more are occurring further out at sea. This trend has 
yet to be observed off of the Indian subcontinent, where 
attacks primarily occur in local waters (Twyman-Ghoshal 
and Pierce 2014).
Pirate tactics, strategies and level of organization also 
vary by region (Nincic 2009; Davenport 2012). Although 
Nigerian pirates focus on oil tankers (Jeong 2015), Somali 
pirates prefer ransom through kidnapping and pirates in 
Southeast Asia focus on opportunistic theft when ships 
are at anchor or berth (Beckman 2002; Nincic 2009; 
Ploch et  al. 2011; Davenport 2012). Pirates operating 
around the Indian subcontinent are motivated by theft 
(Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014) and attacks around 
Bangladesh and India were found to mostly occur on sta-
tionary vessels, while pirates in Indonesia attacked both 
moving and stationary ships equally (Twyman-Ghoshal 
and Pierce 2014).
Pirates are also more sophisticated and organized 
around Southeast Asia compared to East Africa because 
failed states (e.g., Somalia) hamper the pirates’ abil-
ity to create complex networks (Hastings 2009). Pirates 
in Africa tend to be armed with more advanced weap-
ons (e.g., guns, rocket-propelled grenades) compared 
to pirates in Southeast Asia who are usually armed 
with knives and crowbars (Nincic 2009; Sullivan 2010; 
Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014). Unlike African and 
Southeast Asian pirates, Indian pirates are rarely armed 
(Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014). Although Afri-
can pirates are more likely to become violent compared 
to pirates in Southeast Asia (Nincic 2009; Von Hoesslin 
2012), Sullivan (2010) and Ploch et  al. (2011) note that 
most Somali pirates do not kill their victims since their 
goal is ransom.
Adding to the complexity of different types of piracy 
and pirate groups is the notion that piracy itself is 
an evolving phenomenon (Dua and Menkhaus 2012; 
Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014; Sörenson and Widen 
2014). The changing nature of piracy can be seen in Von 
Hoesslin’s (2012) research indicating that sophisticated 
and organized groups operating in the Singapore Strait 
and the South China Sea have adapted to anti-piracy 
measures implemented by government and law enforce-
ment. This is yet another example of why shipmasters 
cannot rely on traditional government and law enforce-
ment for protection.
From the offender’s perspective, several studies suggest 
the primary motivation behind piracy is money (O’Meara 
2007; Chalk 2009; Hansen 2012; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo 
2012), with economic conditions being a main contrib-
uting factor (Vagg 1995; Clark 2009; Onuoha 2009; Von 
Hoesslin 2012). An important piece of the equation that 
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is missing from previous studies is opportunity, which 
is present in all crime (Felson and Clarke 1998) and is a 
contributing factor in piracy. Understanding how oppor-
tunity arises in the piracy context is most complete when 
examined through a situational crime prevention lens, 
which accounts for the victim, the offender and the envi-
ronmental influences. The overwhelming majority of 
previous studies stop short of offering specific measures 
to prevent piracy and do not account for immediate situ-




Situational crime prevention is particularly relevant 
to piracy, since it assists in identifying measures that 
are effective in disrupting the opportunity for an attack 
(Clarke 1980, 1997, 2013). SCP is informed by the three 
separate theories of environmental criminology, which, 
when taken together, amount to “opportunity theory:” 
routine activities (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson and 
Cohen 1980), crime pattern (Brantingham and Branting-
ham 1975, 1984, 1993), and rational choice (Cornish and 
Clarke 1986). Fundamental to environmental criminol-
ogy is the disruption of crime opportunities by manipu-
lating or altering the environment. Opportunities arise 
when a suitable target (vessel), converges in time and 
space with a motivated offender (pirate) in the absence of 
a capable guardian (crew or other authority) (Cohen and 
Felson 1979). This represents the interaction between 
an offender and their environment, which is a departure 
from the traditional “dispositional” theories of crime and 
criminality (e.g., Cullen and Agnew 2006). An offender’s 
disposition (i.e., motivation) is a constant in the crime 
equation, so understanding the characteristics of the tar-
get (those that make it more or less attractive) and the 
environment (those facilitate or inhibit the offender’s 
actions) is where SCP begins to take shape.
Unique to SCP when compared to traditional crimi-
nological theories is its focus on proximate situational 
factors contributing to a crime, as well as its focus on 
specific forms of crime (Clarke 1995, 1997, 2013). There 
is a seemingly infinite supply of motivating factors some 
of which can be controlled by society, but which cannot 
necessarily be controlled as an attack begins. As such, 
SCP theory concentrates on controlling the immediate 
situational environment and preparing for an offender’s 
overt attempt to seize control of the target. When viewed 
from this perspective it is easier to design crime preven-
tion measures that focus on disrupting the convergence 
setting than it is to shape the range of social problems 
that affect someone’s personal circumstance.
Manipulating physical and environmental tempta-
tions resides with “controllers:” (1) capable guardians 
who can alert authorities or physically intervene to stop 
the offender; (2) intimate handlers who personally know 
the offender or who know them by proxy and can exert 
control over their actions and (3) managers who have 
responsibility for controlling behavior and environmen-
tal conditions at specific places (Felson 1995). Cornish 
and Clarke (2003) developed a classification system of 25 
situational techniques organized around five categories 
(increasing the effort, increasing the risks, reducing the 
rewards, reducing provocations, removing excuses) that 
controllers can employ to block opportunities for crime 
to occur. The core focus is to mobilize public, private 
and non-profit resources that are in a position to system-
atically alter the immediate environment, which makes a 
successful attack less likely (Clarke 1980, 1997).
Perpetrating a successful crime partly depends on the 
offender’s calculus about the amount of effort and risk 
required, as well as the potential reward. Consequently, 
actions taken by prospective victims can influence the 
opportunity for crime by manipulating certain aspects 
of their immediate environment so the crime is harder 
to commit, or the eventual rewards are denied. There is 
strong empirical support for SCP across several forms 
of crime and delinquency (Clarke 1997). While early 
studies focused on traditional land-based crime (e.g. 
burglary, motor vehicle theft, alcohol violence, poach-
ing and wildlife crimes), Shane and Magnuson (2014) 
recently applied the theoretical framework to piracy. 
In that study, the authors found that when a ship’s crew 
takes proactive self-protective measures that increase 
the perceived effort and increase the perceived risk of 
perpetrating an attack, unsuccessful attacks are signifi-
cantly more likely after controlling for environmental 
influences. The bivariate analyses revealed support for 
SCP theory, in that certain crime prevention techniques 
were significantly associated with unsuccessful attacks. In 
substantive terms this suggests that unsuccessful attacks 
tend to increase where each of the predictor variables are 
more pronounced. The authors extended the bivariate 
model further by creating a composite index for increas-
ing perceived risk (raising alarm, anti-piracy watch, pri-
vate security, watchman present, increasing lighting) and 
increasing perceived effort (electric perimeter fencing, 
evasive maneuvers, increasing ship speed) and found a 
significant positive relationship with a moderate effect 
size, where an increase in the composite scores was 
associated with an increase in unsuccessful attacks. The 
multivariate model also supported SCP theory; as the 
presence of SCP factors increased, so did the likelihood 
of an unsuccessful attack and the full model accounted 
for 41.5% of the variance in the outcome variable.
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Situational crime prevention and piracy
Prior research suggests that three SCP techniques are par-
ticularly salient in preventing maritime piracy: Increas-
ing the Perceived Effort to Commit Piracy, Increasing the 
Perceived Risk to Commit Piracy, and Reducing the Antici-
pated Rewards of Piracy. Increasing the perceived effort 
means controlling access to places where offenders do 
not belong by erecting real and symbolic barriers that sig-
nal a given area is restricted (Guerette and Clarke 2003; 
Landes 1978; Loomis et  al. 2002; Sherman and Rogan 
1995; Wallis and Ford 1980). Rengelink (2012) extended 
this to the piracy environment and found the most effec-
tive measures included increasing the ship’s speed, engag-
ing in evasive maneuvers and deploying a “sonic gun” (to 
deflect offenders) (see BBC 2007). Deflecting offenders 
disrupts the convergence setting and has also been shown 
to reduce gang homicides and assaults (Lasley 1998) and 
robberies (Poyner 1994). A separate study examined the 
layering effect of SCP measures and found that pirates did 
not board vessels when at least four SCP measures were 
employed (Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014).
Increasing the perceived risk means increasing the 
chance of being apprehended or identified, which means 
raising the prospect the pirates will be seen by some-
one who can take affirmative action (e.g. the crew, port 
employees, local authorities) to prevent the attack. Per-
ceived risk involves a cost-benefit calculation by the 
offender based on the qualities of the target that make it 
more or less suitable for attack (Felson and Clarke 1998, 
p. 54–55). By deliberately augmenting employee surveil-
lance (e.g. lighting, warning alarms), increasing guardi-
anship (e.g. watchmen) and assigning specific on-board 
activities (e.g. antipiracy watch, shipboard security), a 
shipmaster can maximize visibility that leaves pirates 
sensing increased crew vigilance, which has been sup-
ported by previous research in other areas (Braga et  al. 
1999; Clifton 1993). Rengelink (2012) found that naval 
force intervention was an effective measure of increas-
ing guardianship that reduced piracy. An alert crew (e.g., 
watchmen) was also found to be an effective deterrent to 
piracy (Forsyth et al. 2009); in fact, one study found that 
when keeping watch and enhanced vigilance were used 
together with at least two other protective measures, the 
chances of disrupting a pirate attack greatly increased 
(Bryant et al. 2014).
Reducing anticipated rewards means removing the 
target from contact with the offender. If the target is not 
available, then there is little temptation to continue pur-
suing the crime. In many instances it is the ship’s crew 
and not the ship or the cargo that tempts the attack, since 
holding the crew hostage may yield substantial ransom. 
If the crew is mustered to a safe room,a then access is 
denied. This removes the object of the attack and may 
instigate pirates to retreat from their assault. Denying 
pirates the benefit of kidnapping or taking the crew hos-
tage when they board is similar to removing a domestic 
violence victim to a safe house to avoid an attack (Storey 
et  al. 2014), but this is speculative since evaluating safe 
rooms aboard ships has yet to be studied.
The present study
In this study we build upon Shane and Magnuson (2014) 
in two ways. First, we incorporate an additional year of 
data (2013) to further test the effect of SCP on attempted 
piracy attacks. Second, we examine whether SCP tech-
niques hold across continents given the variety of piracy 
worldwide among developing countries. Given local fac-
tors, SCP techniques may not be equally effective around 
the globe, but may be more or less effective depending on 
contextual factors of the pirates, ship crews, and/or set-
tings of the individual continent. We create a series of 
individual and aggregate analyses to test whether situ-
ational crime prevention techniques are equally effective 
in preventing attacks across continents.
Methodology
Data and descriptive statistics
Data were acquired from publically available reports of 
the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (n = 4,902). Data from 
2000 to 2009 were collected by Coggins (2012), while 
Shane and Magnuson (2014) and the authors collected 
the remainder. The IMB follows the definition of Piracy 
provided in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea.b The unit of analysis is 
pirate attacks reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Cen-
tre. Variables in the analysis were coded from questions 
published in the Live Piracy Report. Coding followed 
the schema developed by Shane and Magnuson (2014). 
The dependent variable is binary measuring whether the 
attack was unsuccessful (1) or successful (0). An unsuc-
cessful attack refers to any piracy attempt resulting in “(1) 
approaching a ship but not boarding or (2) boarding a 
ship but leaving without any proceeds” while successful 
attacks refer to piracy attempts resulting in “(1) hijack-
ing, (2) ransom, or (3) theft” (Shane and Magnuson 2014, 
p. 8). In total, nine predictor variables measure the use 
of SCP techniques by the ship’s crew during the attack. 
Five predictor variables are classified according to the 
increasing the perceived risk category of SCP: the use of 
anti-piracy watch, the presence of private security per-
sonnel, raising the alarm, the presence of watchmen, and 
increased lighting. Four predictor variables are classified 
according to the increasing the perceived effort category 
of SCP: electric perimeter fencing, evasive maneuvers, 
increasing speed, and mustering the crew in a fortified 
safe room aboard the ship.c Each of these variables is 
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operationalized as a binary value, measuring its presence 
(1) or absence (0). To measure the totality of SCP tech-
niques employed by the ship’s crew, two continuous vari-
ables were created. The first, Increase Risk Index, is the 
sum of the five aforementioned increase risk variables. 
The second, Increase Effort Index, is the sum of the four 
aforementioned increase effort variables. In addition to 
the predictor variables, the analysis incorporates six con-
trol variables to account for factors that may exert influ-
ence over the outcome of an attack, specifically time of 
day, quarter of the year, the ship’s attack status (station-
ary vs. steaming), type of vessel, the number of pirates, 
and the presence of weapons (i.e., armed pirates).
 Table  1 displays descriptive statistics. About half 
of the attacks (n  =  2,351; 49.4%) were unsuccess-
ful. The Increase Risk Index shows that in nearly half of 
the incidents (n =  2,180; 47.9%) the ship’s crew did not 
incorporate any SCP techniques meant to increase the 
perceived risk of piracy. When such techniques were 
used, they were most often raising the alarm (n = 1,917) 
and the presence of watchmen (n  =  1,241). Increased 
lighting (n =  206), private security (n =  265), and anti-
piracy watches (n  =  307) were employed with much 
less frequently. During approximately 25% of incidents 
(n  =  1,138) the crew used multiple increase risk tech-
niques. Approximately 70% of incidents (n = 3,207) did 
not involve the use of any increase effort tactics. The most 
commonly employed increase effort tactic was muster-
ing the crew (n  =  801) followed by evasive maneuvers 
(n = 667), increasing speed (n = 410) and electric perim-
eter fencing (n = 24). Multiple increase effort tactics were 
used in only 8.3% of incidents (n = 408). Examining the 
control variables, most attacks occurred between the 
hours of 00:00 and 05:59 (n  =  1,964; 48.6%). Incidents 
were relatively evenly spread across the four quarters of 
the year; 26.4% of incidents (n = 1,294) involved armed 
pirates, and ships were attacked most often when station-
ary (n = 2,568; 53.2%) rather than steaming (n = 2,255; 
46.8%). The number of pirates involved in an attack 
ranged from 1 to 200, with a mean of 6.37 and standard 
deviation of 7.13, suggesting wide variability across inci-
dents. Tankers (29.4%) and bulk carriers (23.3%) were the 
most frequently targeted vessel types.
 Table 2 displays the frequency of pirate attacks across 
continents. Attacks most frequently occurred in Africa 
(38.7%) and Southeast Asia (33.2%). Overall, attacks were 
nearly evenly split between successful (n = 2,404; 49.0%) 
and unsuccessful (n  =  2,351; 48.0%). However, vari-
ability did exist across continents. Africa exhibited the 
highest proportion of unsuccessful attacks, with pirates 
failing to hijack the ship and/or obtain proceeds in 59.3% 
of incidents. The Far East exhibited the highest propor-
tion of successful attacks, with pirates securing proceeds 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables n %
Dependent variable: unsuccessful attack
 Yes (1) 2351 49.4
 No (0) 2404 50.6
Independent variables
 Increase perceived risk variables
  Increased Risk Index
   0 2180 47.9
   1 1237 27.2
   2 1051 23.1
   3 87 1.9
  Alarm raised
   Yes (1) 1917 39.7
   No (0) 2913 60.3
  Watchman present
   Yes (1) 1241 25.7
   No (0) 3589 74.3
  Anti-piracy watch
   Yes (1) 307 6.4
   No (0) 4520 93.6
  Private security
   Yes (1) 265 5.5
   No (0) 4565 94.5
  Increased lighting
   Yes (1) 206 4.3
   No (0) 4622 95.7
 Increase perceived effort variables
  Increased Effort Index
   0 3207 70.4
   1 939 20.6
   2 345 7.6
   3 62 1.4
   4 1 0.0
  Evasive maneuvers
   Yes (1) 667 13.8
   No (0) 4161 86.2
  Crew mustered
   Yes (1) 801 16.5
   No (0) 4068 83.5
  Vessel increase speed
   Yes (1) 410 8.5
   No (0) 4414 91.5
  Electric perimeter fence
   Yes (1) 24 0.5
   No (0) 4844 99.5
Control variables n %
Time
 00:00–05:59 1964 48.6
 06:00–11:59 680 16.8
 12:00–17:59 533 13.2
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continents? The research hypothesis (H1) is that situ-
ational crime prevention techniques will be equally effec-
tive in preventing successful attacks across continents. To 
explore this question, we conducted a series of mixed-
effects logistic regression models to predict unsuccess-
ful pirate attacks. Mixed-effects models allow “analytical 
procedures to simultaneously incorporate individual and 
group-level causal processes” (Johnson 2010, p. 621). This 
is accomplished by modeling two different effects: indi-
vidual level effects (level 1), with intercepts and slopes 
describing the population as a whole, and group level 
effects (level 2), with intercepts and slopes varying across 
subgroups (Hamilton 2013; Johnson 2010). In the current 
study, the individual level refers to the total population 
of pirate attacks reported to the IMB (level 1) and the 
group-level refers to the six continents represented in the 
dataset (level 2). While simpler modeling procedures are 
capable of accounting for clustering of cases within sin-
gular data sets (e.g. using robust standard errors adjusted 
to each group within a standard regression model) such 
approaches preclude examination of between-group dif-
ferences (Johnson 2010, p. 628), which is the key aim of 
this paper. The random effects model allows for the pos-
sibility that the occurrence of unsuccessful attacks, and 
their significant predictors, differs across continents. 
Such an analytical approach seems appropriate given the 
patterns observed in Table  2. Collinearity diagnostics 
showed no evidence of multicollinearity.e
First, a random-intercept model was run that allows 
intercepts to vary across continents. With the random 
intercepts accounted for in the calculation of the regres-
sion coefficients, the results report the population-
wide effect of the predictor variables on the dependent 
variable (Hamilton 2013, p. 394). To explore the effect 
of the predictor variables across sub-sets of the popu-
lation (e.g., continents) we conducted a series of ran-
dom-intercept-and-slope models allowing the slopes 
associated with each given SCP predictor variable to 
vary across continents. A likelihood-ratio (LR) test then 
measured whether the fit of the random-intercept-and-
slope model significantly improved upon that of the 
random-intercept model. A significant finding (p < .05) 
suggests that the predictor’s effect on the likelihood of 
an unsuccessful attack differs significantly across conti-
nents. In such cases, the slope for each continent was 
graphed to allow for visual inspection of the heteroge-
neous effect of the technique. This process was repeated 
multiple times, once for each of the SCP variables in the 
model.
We conducted two distinct sets of analyses in explora-
tion of the research question. The first, which we refer to 
as the “aggregate analysis,” incorporates the increased risk 
and increased effort indices as predictor variables. This 
Table 1 continued
Control variables n %
 18:00–23:59 867 21.4
Quarter of the year
 1 Qtr. 1194 24.4
 2 Qtr. 1364 27.8
 3 Qtr. 1146 23.4
 4 Qtr. 1198 24.4
Weapons present
 Yes (1) 1294 49.1
 No (0) 1344 50.9
Vessel status
 Stationary (0) 2568 53.2
 At sail (1) 2255 46.8
Number of pirates
 Mean 6.37 na
 Standard deviation 7.13 na
 Min. 1 na
 Max. 200 na
Vessel type
 Tanker, bulk carrier, or container (1) 3401 69.4
 Other vessel type (0) 1501 30.62
Year
 2000 469 9.6
 2001 334 6.8
 2002 370 7.6
 2003 448 9.1
 2004 335 6.8
 2005 276 5.6
 2006 239 4.9
 2007 263 5.4
 2008 295 6.0
 2009 407 8.3
 2010 458 9.3
 2011 442 9.0
 2012 301 6.1
 2013 265 5.4
in 62.1% of incidents. A Pearson Chi square test found 
that the frequency of successful and unsuccessful attacks 
significantly varied across continents (χ2  =  168.03; 
p.  <  0.01) with a small effect (V  =  0.19, Cohen 1988).d 
This demonstrates that both the frequency and outcome 
of piracy attacks differs across continents and points to 
the need to test whether the global effect of SCP detected 
by Shane and Magnuson (2014) is maintained within 
each individual continent.
Analytic approach
This study addresses the research question Is the effect 
of SCP techniques on piracy attacks consistent across 
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measured the effect the cumulative use of SCP had on the 
occurrence of unsuccessful pirate attacks, and its variance 
across continents. The second, termed the “disaggregate 
analysis,” incorporated seven individual SCP techniques 
as predictor variables: alarm raised, watchman present, 
anti-piracy watch, private security, increased lighting, 
evasive maneuvers, and crew mustered.f This extends the 
aggregate analysis by exploring the effect of specific SCP 
tactics, rather than SCP as a whole, and measuring their 
heterogeneity across continents. In both the aggregate 
and disaggregate models, the aforementioned control 
variables were included.
Results
Table  3 displays the results of the aggregate logistic 
regression models. Both the Increased Risk Index and 
the Increased Effort Index were statistically significant 
and associated with increased likelihood of an unsuc-
cessful attack. For both increased risk (Exp[B]  =  2.81) 
and increased effort (Exp[B] =  2.66) odds ratios suggest 
that for every additional tactic employed, the chance 
for an unsuccessful attack increased over two-fold. Of 
the control variables, both the 06:00–11:59 time period 
(Exp[B] = 2.21), and attack status (Exp[B] = 2.19) were 
significantly associated with an increased likelihood of 
an unsuccessful attack. The presence of weapons was 
associated with a significantly decreased likelihood of an 
unsuccessful attack (Exp[B] = 0.27).
 Table 4 displays the results of the aggregate likelihood-
ratio tests, which measures whether slopes of the SCP 
index variables significantly differed across continents. 
Results illustrate that, with respect to the Increased 
Effort Index, the fit of the random intercept-and-slope 
model was not superior to the random intercept model 
(p =  .10). This suggests that the effect of the Increased 
Effort Index was relatively stable across continents. Con-
versely, results suggest that the fit of the random inter-
cept-and-slope model was significantly better than the 
intercept model in the case of the Increased Risk Index 
(p =  .01). This suggests that the effect of the Increased 
Risk Index on unsuccessful attacks significantly varied 
across continents.
Figure  1 presents the heterogeneity of the Increased 
Risk Index and the odds ratios (Exp[B]) associated with 
each continent.g In total, the Increased Risk Index was 
associated with the increased likelihood of an unsuc-
cessful attack on three continents: South East Asia, Far 
East, and Rest of the World. Of these three, the effect was 
largest in South East Asia, with each one-unit increase 
in the index associated with a 56% greater likelihood of 
an unsuccessful attack (Exp[B]  =  1.56). Conversely, the 
Increased Risk Index was associated with a decreased 
likelihood of an unsuccessful attack in the Americas 
(Exp[B] =  0.69), Africa (Exp[B] =  0.70), and the Indian 
Sub-Continent (Exp[B] = 0.91).
Table 5 presents the results of the disaggregated logis-
tic regression models. Four of the five SCP techniques 
were significantly related to the increased likelihood of 
an unsuccessful attack. Odds ratios ranged from 1.58 in 
the case of crew mustered to 27.02 in the case of evasive 
maneuvers. The only SCP technique that did not achieve 
statistical significance was anti-piracy watch (p  =  .14), 
though the odds ratio was in the expected direction 
(Exp[B] = 1.45). Similar to the aggregate model, the time 
frame of 06:00–11:59 (Exp[B] =  1.96) and attack status 
(Exp[B] =  2.01) were statistically significant and associ-
ated with increased likelihood of an unsuccessful attack. 
Weapons present (Exp[B] = 0.22) and number of pirates 
(Exp[B] = 0.97) were associated with a decreased likeli-
hood of an unsuccessful attack.
Table 2 Piracy attacks across continents
Sum of percentages does not equal exactly 100 % due to rounding. The Chi-square test was conducted on a 6 × 2 cross tabulation with continent of attack (Americas, 
Africa, South East Asia, Far East, Indian sub-continent, Rest of the word) as the rows and attack status (successful or unsuccessful) as the columns
Continent Successful attacks  
(% of category)
Unsuccessful attacks  
(% of category)
Unknown attack status  
(% of category)
Total attacks  
(% of total)
Americas 271 (56.8) 191 (40.0) 15 (3.1) 477 (9.7)
Africa 720 (38.0) 1124 (59.3) 52 (2.7) 1896 (38.7)
South East Asia 901 (55.4) 681 (41.9) 45 (2.8) 1627 (33.2)
Far East 182 (62.1) 95 (32.4) 16 (5.5) 293 (6.0)
Indian sub-continent 295 (54.8) 233 (43.3) 10 (1.9) 538 (11.0)
Rest of the world 35 (52.2) 27 (40.3) 5 (7.5) 67 (1.4)
Not reported 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (100.0) 4 (0.1)
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Table  6 displays the results of the disaggregate like-
lihood-ratio tests. The majority of techniques did not 
achieve statistical significance. The lone exception was 
alarm raised (p =  .02), suggesting a heterogeneity effect 
across continents. Figure  2 displays the odds ratios for 
alarm raised across continents. While the effect of alarm 
raised significantly differed, odds ratios were greater than 
1 in each instance, showing that the technique was asso-
ciated with an increased likelihood of an unsuccessful 
attack within each continent. Odds ratios ranged from a 
low of 1.90 in the case of the Americas to a high of 4.33 in 
the case of South East Asia.
Discussion and policy implications
This study’s findings support the application of SCP tech-
niques aimed at increasing the effort and risk to reduce 
successful pirate attacks across continents. As discovered 
in the aggregate analyses, both indices of increasing the 
risk and increasing the effort were found to be effective 
at reducing successful attacks on a global level. However, 
some differences were found across continents. While 
increasing the effort had the same effect at reducing 
unsuccessful attacks across all regions, increasing the risk 
varied in its effect across continents. Specifically, the use 
of multiple Increased Risk tactics was associated with an 
increased likelihood of unsuccessful attacks in South East 
Asia, Far East, and Rest of the World, and a decreased 
likelihood in the Americas, Africa, and the Indian Sub-
Continent. This suggests that the vulnerability of pirates 
to cumulative SCP measures significantly differs across 
continents.
The disaggregate analyses expanded on these results, 
revealing that all the SCP techniques that increase risk, 
except for anti-piracy watch, were associated with more 
unsuccessful attacks. Furthermore, the effect of all but 
one disaggregated tactic was consistent across conti-
nents. That lone tactic was alarm raised; however, alarm 
raised odds ratios were above 1 for all continents, mean-
ing that the continents differed in terms of the magnitude 
of prevention, not whether prevention was achieved. This 
indicates that the techniques of alarm raised, watchman 
Table 3 Aggregate SCP analysis: mixed-effect logistic regression (n=2638)
The model assumes an unstructured covariance structure to account for the presence of correlation between the random slopes and random intercepts
Listwise deletion of cases
a Reference category for time range controls is 18:00–23:59. Reference category for quarter controls is 4 Qtr.
Variables Odds ratio [Exp(B)] SE z p 95% CI for Exp (B)
Lower Upper
SCP indices
 Increased risk 2.80 0.27 10.85 0.00 2.33 3.37
 Increased effort 2.71 0.44 6.18 0.00 1.98 3.72
Controla
 00:00–05:59 1.11 0.20 0.60 0.55 0.78 1.58
 06:00–11:59 2.21 0.59 2.96 0.00 1.31 3.74
 12:00–17:59 1.19 0.35 0.58 0.56 0.67 2.10
Weapons present 0.27 0.04 −8.76 0.00 0.20 0.36
Vessel status 2.20 0.41 4.30 0.00 1.54 3.16
Vessel type 0.98 0.16 −0.14 0.89 0.71 1.35
 1 Qtr. 1.44 0.30 1.78 0.07 0.96 2.16
 2 Qtr. 0.99 0.20 −0.06 0.95 0.66 1.48
 3 Qtr. 0.95 0.20 −0.23 0.82 0.64 1.43
Number of pirates 0.97 0.17 −1.71 0.09 0.94 1.00
Year 0.98 0.02 −1.04 0.30 0.94 1.02
Model
 Constant 1.44e+19 6.20e+20 1.02 0.31 2.90e−18 7.12e+55
 Log likelihood −594.69
 Wald χ² (p) 245.91 (0.00)
Table 4 Aggregate likelihood-ratio (LR) tests: random-
intercept vs. random-intercept-and-slope models
a The specified random intercept-and-slope models are compared to the 
random intercept model
Model comparisona LR χ² p
Increased risk random intercept-and-slope 9.89 0.01
Increased effort random intercept-and-slope 19.62 0.00
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Fig. 1 Exp(B) of Increased Risk Index across continents.
Table 5 Disaggregate SCP analysis: mixed-effect logistic regression (n=2638)
The model assumes an unstructured covariance structure to account for the presence of correlation between the random slopes and random intercepts
Listwise deletion of cases
a Reference category for time range controls is 18:00–23:59. Reference category for quarter controls is 4 Qtr
Variables Odds ratio [Exp(B)] SE z p 95% CI for Exp (B)
Lower Upper
Increased risk
 Alarm raised 4.33 0.74 8.60 0.00 3.10 6.04
 Watchman present 1.84 0.30 3.72 0.00 1.33 2.53
 Anti-piracy watch 1.24 0.31 0.85 0.40 0.75 2.03
 Private security 9.23 3.85 5.33 0.00 4.07 20.90
 Increased lighting 8.77 4.90 3.88 0.00 2.92 26.24
Increased effort
 Evasive maneuvers 26.81 20.26 4.35 0.00 6.10 117.92
 Crew mustered 1.76 0.32 3.11 0.00 1.23 2.52
Controla
 00:00–05:59 1.04 0.18 0.22 0.83 0.74 1.47
 06:00–11:59 2.01 0.53 2.64 0.01 1.20 3.38
 12:00–17:59 0.99 0.29 −0.03 0.98 0.55 1.77
Weapons present 0.24 0.04 −9.31 0.00 0.18 0.33
Vessel status 2.05 0.38 3.87 0.00 1.42 2.95
Vessel type 0.94 0.15 −0.42 0.67 0.68 1.29
 1 Qtr. 1.50 0.30 2.02 0.04 1.01 2.23
 2 Qtr. 1.02 0.21 0.12 0.91 0.69 1.52
 3 Qtr. 1.06 0.21 0.27 0.78 0.71 1.57
Number of pirates 0.97 0.02 −1.91 0.06 0.94 1.00
Year 0.90 0.02 −5.32 0.00 0.87 0.94
Model
 Constant 4.42e+88 1.70e+90 5.31 0.00 8.50e+55 2.3e+121
 Log likelihood −618.86
 Wald χ² (p) 269.59 (0.00)
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present, private security, and increased lighting can and 
should be applied in all regions to prevent successful 
attacks.
Overall, the findings lend support to the SCP notion 
regarding the importance of being crime-specific when 
formulating and implementing possible measures aimed 
at preventing and disrupting crime (Clarke 2013). As 
detailed in the literature review, piracy varies in form 
depending on the region. Thus, some SCP techniques 
may have a larger positive effect at reducing attacks in 
certain regions than others. For example, raising the 
alarm had a larger effect in South East Asia compared 
to the other regions, indicating that this technique may 
need to be emphasized and utilized more in South East 
Asia than in other regions. Perhaps pirates in South East 
Asia are more threatened by a ship’s alarm given the fact 
that they tend to operate closer to shore (Von Hoesslin 
2012) and are usually armed with knives or crowbars 
instead of guns (Nincic 2009; Sullivan 2010). This may 
make them feel more susceptible to being apprehended 
when an alarm sounds.
Perhaps the most important policy implication is that 
despite the pirates’ personal position or whether they are 
armed, the prospect of an unsuccessful attack is more 
likely when layers of increase effort measures are imple-
mented. These measures have added importance when 
vessels are at anchor or in port, where guardianship may 
be lower due to over-extended or corrupt police forces 
and the realities associated with failed or weak states’ 
ability to provide protection. The findings also imply that 
shipping vessels do not necessarily have to arm them-
selves, which may escalate an attack, nor rely on govern-
ment to protect them while at sea. What makes SCP so 
appealing is that shipping companies can become more 
self-reliant and avoid implementation issues associated 
with multiple agencies.
However, we also acknowledge the somewhat para-
doxical relationship between the findings of the aggre-
gate and disaggregate analyses, specifically with regards 
to the increased risk index. The disaggregate analysis 
found that each individual SCP technique significantly 
increased the likelihood of unsuccessful attacks on a 
global level. Across continents, alarm raised differently 
impacted piracy, but was associated with increased like-
lihood of unsuccessful attacks in each instance. There-
fore, while some heterogeneity was evident with this 
technique, it can be classified as an effective crime con-
trol tactic in each instance. A different picture emerged 
when we analyzed the use of multiple techniques in the 
aggregate analysis, via the increased effort and increased 
risk indices. While both increased effort and increased 
risk were associated with increased likelihood of unsuc-
cessful attacks on a global level, the increased risk index 
was associated with unsuccessful attacks in only 3 of the 
6 continents included in this study (South East Asia, Far 
East, an Rest of the World). In the Americas, Africa, and 
Indian Sub-Continent, the increased risk index was actu-
ally associated with a decreased likelihood of an unsuc-
cessful attack. This implies an interesting relationship 
between the different SCP techniques as they relate to 
Table 6 Disaggregate likelihood-ratio (LR) tests: random-
intercept vs. random-intercept-and-slope models
a The specified random intercept-and-slope models are compared to the 
random intercept model
Model comparisona LR χ² p
Alarm raised random intercept-and-slope 8.61 0.01
Watchman present random intercept-and-slope 0.70 0.40
Anti-piracy watch random intercept-and-slope 0.45 0.80
Private security random intercept-and-slope 1.59 0.45
Increased lighting random intercept-and-slope 0.04 0.98
Evasive maneuvers random intercept-and-slope 1.52 .47
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Fig. 2 Exp(B) of Alarm Raised across continents.
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piracy. In particular, while each individual tactic on its 
own increases the likelihood of unsuccessful attacks, the 
combination of various tactics does not always work as 
intended. Future research should aim to better under-
stand the combination of tactics that best prevent piracy 
attacks. Indeed, Bryant et  al. (2014) recently found that 
the use of Watch Keeping and Enhanced Vigilance (WK 
and EV) in addition with other tactics was more effec-
tive than any combination of tactics absent WK and EV. 
Future research should continue to explore these issues.
Limitations and directions for future research
Limitations
Reporting piracy to the IMB is voluntary so there may be 
some measure of underreporting due to potential insur-
ance costs, image and reputation of the shipping com-
pany and heightened perception of risk among shipping 
clientele. Counting piracy incidents depends on the defi-
nition; different definitions do exist such those offered 
by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (Arti-
cle 15) and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Article 101), which may not 
include theft so the full extent of piracy and economic 
losses may not be fully captured. The data published by 
the IMB in their annual report are summary data and 
may also contain errors due to collection and report-
ing processes (Jacob 1984). Some of this was evident in 
the yearly data, which is why data before 2000 was not 
included. The SCP principles may also suffer from “…
unavoidable overlap among categories” (Clarke 1997, p. 
17), which may introduce a degree of measurement error. 
In addition, the analysis did not account for characteris-
tics of the crew operating the under-attack vessels, which 
may be related to the likelihood of unsuccessful attacks. 
Certain ship crews may be more experienced in combat-
ing piracy, and may more effectively incorporate SCP 
techniques. Therefore, crew-specific variables may have 
an interaction effect with certain SCP tactics and may 
alter the findings of the analysis if measured.
Directions for future research
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the 
literature on piracy prevention by illustrating how dif-
ferent SCP tactics, and magnitudes of tactics, perform 
against piracy on both a global and continental level. 
Future research can expand on these findings and explore 
whether the effectiveness of the SCP measures vary at the 
country level. In addition, future studies can test how the 
techniques relating to increasing the risk and increasing 
the effort vary depending on particular attack charac-
teristics, such as the type of piracy involved (e.g., oppor-
tunistic theft vs. ransom) as well as the type of pirate 
weapons present (e.g., lack of weapons, firearms, knives). 
At a basic level, opportunity is present in all crimes and 
facilitated by illicit opportunity structures and exploited 
by weaknesses in social control. Theories of crime and 
criminality from other disciplines such as political sci-
ence and international relations can provide a framework 
of the social and environmental processes that promote 
and sustain piracy on land.
Conclusion
Overall, the theory is supported. When measures to 
increase risk and effort are applied, there is a statisti-
cally significant increase in unsuccessful pirate attacks, 
after controlling for other influences. For each additional 
tactic employed that increases risk or increases effort, 
there is an increase of more than twofold for unsuccess-
ful attacks. In general, the findings imply that SCP can be 
applied on the water, where help is not readily available. 
The measures can be applied without resorting to fire-
arms, which may only escalate an encounter with pirates. 
The SCP measures identified here can be incorporated 
into the planning and operational practices of the ship-
ping industry for ship operators and masters transiting 
high-risk waters worldwide.
Endnotes
aA safe room is a fortified space aboard a ship designed 
to protect the crew if pirates board the vessel.
bhttps://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre.
cShane and Magnuson (2014) conceptualized Crew 
Mustered as the lone Reduce the Anticipated Rewards 
measure in their study. We re-conceptualized this meas-
ure as part of the Increase Effort category so that it better 
fit with the other variables and research question. While 
this approach differed from Shane & Magnuson’s, it still 
strongly adheres to the SCP principles. For one, having 
to breach a fortified room to take a crew hostage indeed 
increases the required effort for obtaining a ransom. 
Also, the differing approaches reflect the unavoidable 
overlap inherent in the opportunity-reducing techniques 
of SCP (Clarke 1997, p. 17).
dSTATA version 13 was used to conduct all statistical 
analyses for this study.
eA Tolerance value of .01 or less generally indicates the 
presence of multicollinearity. Tolerance scores ranged 
from .623 to .990. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
score is the reciprocal of Tolerance and VIF scores that 
exceed 10 indicate multicollinearity. VIF scores range 
from 1.01 to 1.61 (Meyers et al. 2006, p. 212).
fTwo of the disaggregated SCP variables, Increase 
Speed and Electric Perimeter Fence were excluded from 
the disaggregated models because the models failed to 
converge when these variables were included as random 
effects, due to a lack of variance across continents. Given 
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this observed lack of variance, the variables were dropped 
from the model (Hamilton 2013, p. 404).
gThe exponential of the slope (Exp[B]) rather than the 
slope (B) is presented to allow for easy comparison with 
the logistic regression model findings.
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